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The Spanish Experience in Church-State 
Relations: A Comparative Study of the 
Interrelationship Between Church-State 
Identification and Religious Liberty* 
On December 9, 1978, the people of Spain ratified a new 
constitution whose article sixteen brings complete religious free- 
dom to Spain for the first time in nearly half a century. Article 
sixteen of the new Constitution also outlines a parallel change in 
the identification of the Spanish State with the Spanish Catholic 
Church. This Comment is the most recent Spanish answer to 
two questions that have confronted constitution drafters since 
Madison penned the first amendment to the United States Con- 
stitution: 1) to what degree should the state restrict the individ- 
ual's free religious choice, and 2) to what extent should the state 
identify with the church (or churches in a pluralistic society). 
This Comment explores the interplay between these two ques- 
tions in Spanish constitutional history, with particular emphasis 
on developments since 1966. 
Spain has been chosen for this comparative study for sev- 
eral reasons. First, its constitutional experience since 1800 has 
included a wide variety of approaches to the religious question. 
This large number of different approaches within basically the 
same system of variables facilitates the development of a model 
to demonstrate the relationship between church-state identifica- 
tion and religious freedom. Secondly, Spanish religious homoge- 
neity-ninety-eight percent of the population nominally belongs 
to only one church-is ideal for developing a model because it 
contains fewer variables than the American pluralistic society. 
Thirdly, the extensive but gradual changes that have occurred in 
Spanish church-state relations since 1963 allow examination of 
the model as it functions. 
I. INTRODUCTION OF THE MODEL 
Church-state questions involve two central issues: 1) state 
* Unless otherwise indicated all tramlatiom from Spanish material are by the 
author. The author did much of the research and observation that led to the writing of 
this Comment while living and working in Madrid, Spain in the late 1970's. 
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identification with one or more religious establishments versus 
nonidentification by the state with religious establishments, and 
2) religious freedom versus no religious freedom. Church-state 
identification refers to the degree and type of interrelation be- 
tween the state, as the governmental expression of society, and 
the church, as the institutional manifestations of society's reli- 
gious expression. In other words, the identification question re- 
fers to the relations of the state with the institutional manifesta- 
tions of man's religious expression. Religious freedom refers to 
the position taken by the state and the society toward the indi- 
vidual's forms of religious expression. Full religious freedom can 
be described as the right to be free from societal and govern- 
mental coercion in religious matters. The degree to which a state 
allows its citizens freedom from religious coercion is a measure 
of the amount of religious freedom that that state provides. 
For the purpose of developing a model to illustrate the rela- 
tion between church-state identification and religious freedom, 
the two concepts will be viewed as two separate lines: 
Church-State Identification 
I C - - 











Although these concepts appear as polarities in the linear model, 
they should be considered as spectra, distinct and not necessa- 
rily codeterminant, but obviously interrelated. 
The identification line extends from one extreme where 
identification is complete, meaning the church is the state,' 
1. Such total identification is approached in the modern world only in certain Is- 
lamic states or in isolated situations such as Tibet prior to the Communist invasion. 
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through a variety of "confessional states,"' to systems of clear 
separation between church and state. From mere separation of 
church and state this line continues to a position of negative 
identification where the state is not merely indifferent or impar- 
tial toward religious establishments, but actually discourages, re- 
stricts, and even prohibits institutional manifestations of 
religion? 
At one extreme of the religious freedom line, the state pro- 
tects the individual from all forms of coercion in religious mat- 
ters. At the opposite extreme, the state denies religious freedom 
to the individual and either demands adoption of a particular 
religious creed or denies religious experience altogether. Between 
the extremes on the religious freedom line lie varying degrees of 
religious toleration, either for members of all churches or for 
members of all but one church which might receive favorable 
treatment or be entirely prohibited. 
A brief overview of the church-state positions of several dif- 
ferent countries will clarify the church-state model. The posi- 
tions of the states that formed the original nucleus of the Euro- 
pean Economic Community vary widely on the identification 
line despite their common subscription to the principles of reli- 
gious freedom outlined in the 1950 European Convention of 
Rome and in the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights? 
France has a system of total separation of church and state that 
might best be characterized as a liberal indifference. Religious 
institutions are treated basically the same as other civil associa- 
tions and are allowed to function as they wish provided they do 
not threaten public order as defined by the state.' Holland, by 
contrast, has a system of separation, but the government main- 
tains a more watchful legal stance toward religious  association^.^ 
Belgium allows full religious liberty and officially recognizes no 
2. A confessional state can be defined as one where the great majority of the politi- 
cal community practices a single religion and especially where the ethical, moral, and 
social principles of this religion have decisively influenced the formation of the popula- 
tion's ethical-cultural heritage. See A. BERNARDEZ, APUNTES SOBRE REACCIONES ENTRE LA 
IGLESIA Y EL ESTADO 221 (1974). 
3. M. FRAGA IRIBARNE & J. PEREZ ALLANA, EL ESTADO Y LA IGLESIA EN ESPANA 30 
(1972) [hereinafter cited as M. FFWGA]. In developing the model the author has drawn 
ideas from several Spanish authors. See generally Id. at 30; A. BERNARDEZ, supra note 2, 
at 18-21,35-65; C. CORRAL SALVADOR, LA LIBERTAD ~ L I G I O S A  EN LA COMUNIDAD EUROPEA 
(1973). 
4. See C. CORRAL SALVADOR, supra note 3, at 14-49. 
5. See id. at 70-118. 
6. See id. at 156-222. 
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single religion, but its Constitution specifically authorizes the 
payment of salaries and pensions for ministers of several "recog- 
nized" religions, including the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish 
religions.' Luxembourg follows a similar pattern, but restricts 
some activities of religious  association^.^ Germany takes an 
equally strong position on religious liberty. Although its Consti- 
tution declares there is to be no state church, major churches are 
given special status as public associations, and the government 
collects mandatory contributions for the two major denomina- 
tions from their members? 
Other parts of the world exhibit even greater diversity in 
the patterns of church-state relations. The United States, by its 
Constitution, lies within the separation of church and state por- 
tion of the identification line and on the freedom end of the reli- 
gious liberty line. The Soviet Union is positioned on the negative 
identification end of the separation of church and state line. On 
the religious freedom line the Soviet Union is found, at least in 
practice, on the heavy restriction side.1° England offers religious 
freedom while maintaining a ceremonial identification with an 
established church.ll In Sweden the Lutheran Church is the 
state church, and non-Lutherans, especially Catholics, receive 
only religious toleration.la In South America there are countries 
spread across both lines with no readily apparent correlation be- 
tween one line and the other? 
By assigning the various countries positions on the lines of 
the model according to their relative degrees of church-state 
identification and religious freedom, the model appears this way: 
7. See id. at 282-89. 
8. See id. at 307-60. 
9. See id. at 361-496. 
10. M. FRAGA, supra note 3, at 30. 
11. C. CORRAL SALVADOR, supra note 3, at 38. 
12. R. P A ~ ,  THIS IS SPAIN 377-78 (1951); C. COW SALVADOR, supra note 3, at 
36. 
13. See generally J. MECHAM, CHURCH AND STATE IN LATIN AMERICA (rev. ed. 1966). 
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Examination of the relationship between a country's posi- 
tion on the identification line versus its position on the religious 
freedom line yields no clear pattern. The widely held belief that 
decreasing religious freedom is synonymous with increasing 
church-state identification is contradicted by the conditions in 
countries such as the Islamic states and the Soviet Union which 
are at the same end of the religious freedom line and at opposite 
ends of the identification line. Apparently any degree of church- 
state identification can be coupled with some form of religious 
freedom or restriction. The following historical analysis of 
church-state relations in Spain over the last 150 years will bring 
this interrelationship into clearer focus through examination of 
Spain's dramatic shifts in church-state identification and reli- 
gious freedom. 
A. Early Constitutional Period 1800-1869 
By 1800 the Spanish State had sufficiently felt the impact of 
both the Enlightenment and modern concepts of constitutional- 
ism to make possible an evaluation of church-state relations in 
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modern terms. At that time, Spain was found high on the posi- 
tive end of the identification line and approaching no religious 
freedom on the other line. Under the Concordat of 1753, the 
Catholic Church was clearly state-established; more accurately, 
it was controlled by the State.14 
The first written Constitution, in 1812, evidenced little de- 
sire to change the position of high positive identification and no 
religious freedom. A measure in the original draft had proposed 
that "no citizen be inconvenienced in his religion, whatever it 
might be," but was soundly defeated? The document as 
adopted read: "The religion of the Spanish nation is, and shall 
be perpetually, Apostolic Roman Catholic, the only true religion. 
The nation protects it by wise and just laws and prohibits the 
exercise of any other, whatsoever."16 
The fact that this otherwise liberal document provided for 
high identification and no religious freedom was indicative of 
the view held by most Spaniards concerning the role of the 
Catholic Church. Most interests of the Church and the State 
were, in the minds of the people, synonymous. The implement- 
ing legislation, however, indicated that not all interests of the 
Church and the State were parallel. The Cortes (national legisla- 
tive body) took action against the Inquisition and the Catholic 
0rders.17 When the members of the Church hierarchy protested 
these measures, several bishops were exiled or imprisoned and 
the papal nuncio was expelled from Spain. When Ferdinand VII 
returned to the throne he declared all actions of the 1811 Cortes 
null and void, and therefore these anti-church actions by the 
Cortes were never fully implemented.18 
In 1820 a military revolt forced Ferdinand VII to convoke a 
Cortes and reinstate the Constitution of 1812. Many of the lead- 
ers of the revolt were active Masons and were very liberal for 
their time? After coming to power, the liberal government 
moved immediately against the Church. The Jesuits and at least 
one bishop were expelled, other orders were severely restricted 
14. E. PEERS, SPAIN, THE CHURCH AND THE ORDERS 56-58 (1945). 
15. J. MONROY, LIBERTAD RELIGIOSA Y ECUMENISMO 74 (1967). 
16. Constitution of 1812, tit. 11, ch. 11, art. 12 translated in A. VERDUIN, MANUAL OF 
SPANISH CONSTITUTIONS 1808-1931, at 12 (1941). This book contains good English trans- 
lations of all Spanish constitutional documents up to and including the 1931 
Constitution. 
17. J. HUGHEY, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN SPAIN 18 (2nd ed. 1970). 
18. Id. 
19. R. SMITH, SPAIN: A MODERN HISTORY 302 (1965). 
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and Church property was seized? A period of violent anticleri- 
calism in various parts of the country followed in which many 
monks, nuns, and clergy lost their lives." Without changing the 
Constitution of 1812 the government and society had turned the 
high positive identification between the Church and the State 
into an attempt to control the Church by force and intimidation. 
Foreign intervention, under the direction of Metternich and 
Talleyrand, freed the monarch and restored reactionary rule and 
the Church's position. That position remained the same until 
the death of Ferdinand, when his daughter, Isabel 11, and her 
supporters (generally the more liberal portions of Spanish soci- 
ety) came into power? At this time Spain experienced nation- 
wide anticlerical riots where "[hlundreds of religious houses 
were wholly or partially destroyed by fire; hundreds of priests 
and laymen were killed; [and] hundreds of works of art [were] 
lost for ever [sic]."" The government did not quell the rioting, 
rather it chose to expel the Jesuits, close religious houses, and 
seize the Church's lands to help pay the costs of the civil war.24 
This strong anticlerical sentiment had greatly subsided by 1837 
when a new Constitution was drafted and moderate groups tem- 
pered the constitutional convention. 
The Constitution of 1837 was a statement of classical nine- 
teenth century liberalism and "served as a model for the struc- 
ture of most of the later nineteenth century Spanish constitu- 
tions? In the area of religion, the Constitution was 
surprisingly moderate. Title I, article 11, the only provision per- 
taining to religion, reads: "The nation is obliged to maintain the 
cult and the ministers of the Catholic religion which Spaniards 
profess."2s 
Despite the Constitution's positive identification of the 
Spanish State and society with the Catholic Church, the anti- 
clerical attitude of the government continued. During the re- 
gency of the progressive General Espartero," bishops and priests 
were removed from office, bishops were appointed without the 
20. E. PEERS, supra note 14, at 64-65. 
21. Id. at 65-66, 69-71. 
22. Id. at 68-71. 
23. Id. at 71. 
24. R. SMITH, supra note 19, at 315-16. 
25. A. VERDUIN, supra note 16, at 40. 
26. Id. at 41. 
27. Espartero became regent in May 1841 and was forced to flee Spain in July 1843. 
R. S m ,  supra note 19, at 323-25. 
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approval of Rome, and the nunciature was closed.18 A series of: 
provocative exchanges between the government and the Vatican 
followed, and the Pope addressed an encyclical to the world on 
the sad state of the Spanish Church, calling on all Catholics to 
pray for change.%@ 
In 1844 after nearly a decade of turbulent Progressive rule, 
the Moderates once again regained control and drafted a new 
and extremely conservative Const i tut i~n.~~ The approach to 
church-state relations was representative of the Moderate policy 
of reconciliation with the Church. Article eleven in the new Con- 
stitution read: "The religion of the Spanish nation is the Apos- 
tolic Roman Catholic religion. The State binds itself to maintain 
the cult and its rninister~."~~ 
The Penal Code of 1848, a key part of the implementing 
legislation, is illustrative of the high degree of identification be- 
tween the Spanish State and the Catholic Church under the 
Constitution of 1845. While there were no penalties for failure to 
practice the Catholic religion or for personally rejecting Catholic 
dogma, the penalties for public acts against the Church or its 
dogmas were severe. Anyone who tried to change or abolish the 
Roman Catholic religion or who celebrated public acts of wor- 
ship of a non-Catholic religion could be imprisoned for twelve to 
twenty years. Lesser prison sentences were imposed for "incul- 
cating the non-observance of the religious precepts, or making 
mock of the sacraments of the Church, or persisting in publish- 
ing doctrines condemned by the ecclesiastical authoritie~."~~ Im-
plementation of this code moved the Spanish State toward ex- 
treme non-religious freedom and enhanced the positive 
identification of the Church with the State. 
The identification of the Catholic Church and the State was 
further enhanced by the concordat negotiated with the Vatican 
in 1851.ssArticle one is representative of this document's total 
commitment to church-state identification: 
The Apostolic Roman Catholic religion, which with the exclu- 
sion of all other cults continues to be the only one of the Span- 
ish nation, will be conserved always in the domains of His 
28. J. HUGHEY, supra note 17, at 21-22. 
29. Id. 
30. A. VERDUIN, supra note 16, at 45. 
31. Id. at 46. 
32. J. HUGHEY, supra note 17, at 22-23. 
33. E. PEERS, supra note 14, at 79. 
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Catholic Majesty, with all the rights and prerogatives which it 
should enjoy according to the law of God and the prescriptions 
of the sacred  canon^.^' 
The church-state identification imposed by the Concordat 
of 1851 eliminated religious freedom, completing the impetus 
given by the Constitution of 1845 and the Penal Code of 1848. 
All instruction, both public and private, was to be controlled by 
the Catholic hierarchy and in accordance with Catholic dogma. 
The public authorities were to support the clergy in all their ac- 
tivities, especially those involving censorship of undesirable 
propaganda. The special privileges enjoyed by Catholic clergy 
under Canon law were protected by the government. The 
Church was guaranteed the right to hold property and the gov- 
ernment agreed to pay all the clergy a stipend as remuneration 
for the property seized during the past century.86 
Most of the opposition to the Concordat came from the 
Progessives (liberals) who were out of power. Some opposition to 
such high positive identification of the Church and the State was 
raised by individuals in the Church.86 These individuals feared 
that too close an association between Church and State would 
work to the Church's detriment. Their fears concerning the sub- 
ordination of the Catholic Church to the State were soon con- 
firmed when the liberals once again gained control of the govern- 
ment in 1854. Neither the Constitution, the Penal Code, nor the 
Concordat prevented the liberals from immediately renewing 
their attack on the Church. An expropriation law was enacted to 
take away the lands returned to the Church under the Concor- 
dat and any property newly acquired by the religious orders. 
The Jesuits were once again expelled, several bishops and the 
nuncio were exiled, all religious processions in the streets were 
banned, and government censorship was imposed on Catholic 
newspapers." All of these actions were not intended to establish 
religious freedom, rather they were intended to disestablish the 
Catholic Church, or at least reduce it to total subservience to the 
State. 
Only two years later the Moderates regained control of the 
government and reinstated the Constitution of 1845 with its 
34. J. HUGHEY, supra note 17, at 23. 
35. R. PA-, supra note 12, at 348-49. 
36. See id. at 72. 
37. J. HUGHEY, supra note 17, at 23-24, E. PEERS, supra note 14, at 85. 
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high positive identification and total lack of religious freedom. 
This remained the position of the Spanish government until the 
revolution of 1868, which deposed Isabel I1 and brought the lib- 
erals back into power? 
Several characteristics of Spanish church-state relations are 
evident in this early period. Perhaps most obvious is the ease 
with which a change in government brought a shift from positive 
identification to negative, antichurch identification. Based on 
this history, positive identification and negative identification 
appear to be closely related. Equally clear is the fact that reli- 
gious freedom is not an inherent characteristic of either positive 
or negative church-state identification. Religious freedom was 
never a part of any Constitution from 1812 to 1869 and was de- 
feated when proposed for inclusion in both liberal and conserva- 
tive Constitutions. 
B. The Constitution of 1869 and the First Republic 
At the beginning of the revolution of 1868, local revolution- 
ary committees took immediate actions against the Catholic 
Church. Some local bishops and priests as well as the Jesuits 
were expelled, and many chapels were confis~ated.~@ Several of 
the local juntas declared religious freedom a universal principle, 
yet ironically, ordered the demolition of local Catholic churches. 
The provisional government in Madrid suppressed the Jesuits, 
closed certain monasteries and convents, and granted permission 
for the establishment of several non-Catholic schools. It also or- 
dered the confiscation of all libraries, archives, museums, and 
art collections held by the Church/O Religious freedom became 
the official policy of the Spanish government. The complicated 
questions concerning relations between the Catholic Church and 
the State were deferred to the constituent power.41 That constit- 
uent power took the form of a new Cortes that was elected in 
1869. Its first task was to draft a new Constitution. 
The articles on religion in the proposed draft evoked wide- 
spread debate, in which three basic positions emerged: 1) those 
who favored a return to absolute Catholic unity as manifested in 
the Constitution of 1845; 2) those who favored a total separation 
38. R. HERR, AN HISTORICAL ESSAY ON MODERN SPAIN 103-05 (1971). 
39. J. HUGHEY, supra note 17, at 34. 
40. Id. at 36. 
41. Id. 
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of church and state and religious freedom for all (although, iron- 
ically this group also favored anti-Catholic legislation as the only 
means of reducing the Catholic Church's immense power); and 
3) those who sought some form of compromise, either by main- 
taining the positive identification of the Catholic Church with 
the State while granting minimal religious toleration to non- 
Catholic individuals, or conversely, by granting religious free- 
dom but maintaining some identification of the Church and the 
State in recognition of the basically Catholic nature of the Span- 
ish people.'The latter compromise approach held sway in the 
Constitution of 1869 as finally promulgated-in title I, article 21: 
The nation binds itself to maintain the cult and the minis- 
ters of the Catholic religion. 
The public or private observance of any other cult is guar- 
anteed to all foreigners resident in Spain, without any further 
limitations than the universal rules of morality and right- 
All the provisions of the preceding paragraph are applica- 
ble to those Spanish people who profess religion other than 
Catholici~m.'~ 
The legislation adopted under the Constitution of 1869 im- 
plemented the policy of religious freedom. The new Penal Code 
promulgated in 1870 offered protection to all religions. It pun- 
ished anyone who forced others to practice religious acts or who 
hindered or disturbed religious services. The legislative provi- 
sions remained completely neutral in regard to Catholicism." 
Civil registry of births, marriages, and deaths was instituted. Be- 
cause religious marriages were no longer recognized, there were 
no prohibitions against their accompanying the civil marriage.4s 
Orders were issued providing for the burial of non-Catholics in 
the cemeterie~.'~ Non-Catholic children were excused from reli- 
gious instr~ct ion.~~ 
The Constitution of 1869 and the religious freedom it en- 
shrined were short-lived. After two turbulent years, the new king 
of Spain abdi~ated:~ and a republic was proclaimed. Religious 
Id. at  38-49. 
Constitution of 1869, tit. I, art. 21, translated in A. VERDUIN, supra note 16, at 
J .  HUGHEY, supra note 17, at  54. 
Id. 
Id. at  57. 
Id. at  55. 
R. SMITH, supra note 19, at  357. 
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freedom was to be augmented by the separation of the Catholic 
Church and the State in the proposed draft of a republican con- 
stitution.'* This draft was never debated in the full Cortes be- 
cause the dissatisfaction with the instability of the Republic be- 
came so great that in December, 1874, several generals declared 
Isabel 11's son, Alfonso XII, King of Spain.'O 
This period represented, for the first time in Spanish his- 
tory, a move toward the religious freedom end of the line and a 
concurrent move away from the extremes of positive or negative 
identification. The implementing legislation, defining the param- 
eters of the constitutional grant of religious freedom, not only 
protected the individual from antireligious governmental action, 
but also assured Catholics that they were to be equally protected 
from a governmental switch to negative identification. One un- 
answered question was whether separation of the Catholic 
Church and the State, as proposed in the draft constitution of 
the First Republic, could have been achieved without endanger- 
ing the religious freedom of the Catholic majority. 
C. The Constitution of 1876 
The Constitution of the Restoration, promulgated in 1876, 
brought at  least a minimum of stability to Spain and was in 
force until 1931, longer than any other Spanish Constitution. In 
an attempt to achieve political unity and stability, the Constitu- 
tion of 1876 tried to satisfy the Catholic Church and its par- 
tisans, more than the constitution of 1869 had done, yet still 
salve the consciences of the liberals.61 In an effort to forge a 
compromise acceptable to at  least a large majority, the Constitu- 
tion of 1876 enshrined a new concept in Spanish history: reli- 
49. The articles on religion in the Constitution proposed in 1873 read: 
Article 34-The observance of all cults shall be free in Spain. 
Article 35-The church is separated from the state. 
, Article 36-The direct or indirect subsidizing of any cult is forbidden to the 
nation or federal state, and to regional states, and municipalities. 
Article 37-Records of birth, marriage, and death shall be registered by the 
civial [sic] authorities. 
A. VERDUIN, supra note 16, at 70. 
50. R. HERR, supra note 38, at 110. 
51. Two diametrically opposed foreign influences were also being balanced: papal 
pressure which extended to the point of a papal decree specifically condemning the 
paragraphs in the 1876 Constitution dealing with the concept of religious toleration, and 
pressure from the more liberal nations, particularly Britain, whose embassies and consul- 
ates frequently intervened on behalf of non-Catholics who were being harassed or 
persecuted. 
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gious toleration. 
Article 11-The Apostolic Roman Catholic religion is the relig- 
ion of the state. The nation binds itself to maintain this cult 
and its ministers. 
No one in Spanish territory shall be molested for his reli- 
gious opinions, or for the observance of his particular form of 
worship, provided that he shows proper respect to Christian 
morality. 
Public manifestations and ceremonies other than those of 
the religion of the state, however, shall not be ~ermitted.~' 
The identification between the Catholic Church and the State 
remained relatively positive and the Church maintained a posi- 
tion of great favor and control, but non-Catholic sects were le- 
gally recognized, and freedom of conscience and private religious 
practice were tolerated. 
Toleration proved to be a concept that lent itself to a vari- 
ety of interpretations and practices. The point where Spain was 
found on the religious freedom line varied greatly depending on 
the government in power. During the early years of the Coneti- 
tution of 1876, the interpretation of religious toleration in the 
Royal Order of October 1876 pushed the definition of religious 
toleration as close to no religious freedom as was possible within 
the constitutional framework: 
1. From this date all public manifestations of the cults or 
sects dissident from the Catholic religion are forbidden outside 
the precincts of their temples or cemeteries. 
2. For the effects of the previous rule, by public manifestation 
will be understood everything in the street or on the exterior 
walls of the temple or of the cemetery which gives knowledge 
of the ceremonies, rites, usages, and customs of the dissident 
cult, including signs, banners, emblems, advertisements, and 
posters.6s 
Under the Constitution of 1876, civil marriage was denied to 
those who were Catholics-although civil registration of the ca- 
nonical marriage was r e q ~ i r e d ; ~  former priests and monks were 
not allowed to marry; anti-Catholic statements were not permit- 
ted to be published by the press;ss religion was taught in the 
52. A. VERDUIN, supra note 16, at 78. 
53. J. HUGHEY, supra note 17, at 87-88. 
54. S. DE MADARIAGA, SPNN: A MODERN HISTORY 162-63 (1958). 
55. J. HUGHEY, supra note 17, at 71-72. 
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public  school^;^ and attendance at mass was compulsory for 
those in the armed forces.67 
During the early twentieth century, a slight trend toward 
religious freedom emerged. Under the liberal government of 
1910, the restrictions on public manifestations of non-Catholic 
religions were modified to allow signs and symbols on the 
outside of Protestant churches and to permit some public meet- 
ings." During this period several courts upheld the rights of 
non-Catholics in cases involving freedom of conscience and per- 
sonal religious actions." Mandatory attendance at mass for 
those serving in the armed forces was also relaxed.@O The govern- 
ment manifested a willingness to treat fairly those who chose not 
to adhere to the Catholic dogma as long as they did not openly 
proselyte or openly criticize or ridicule Catholic beliefs and 
practices. 
On the surface, the Constitution of 1876 had achieved peace 
and stability, but the compromises making that possible failed 
to reach the underlying stresses and strains in the fabric of 
Spanish society. Inability to participate effectively in the electo- 
ral process eventually alienated the industrial workers, the agra- 
rian poor, and the liberal  intellectual^.^^ As new doctrines of 
communism, anarchism, and socialism grew, the political system 
deteriorated. Finally, in 1923, Miguel Primo de Rivera, declared 
himself military dictator ." 
Under Primo de Rivera, the doctrine of religious toleration 
was restricted to its narrowest definition and virtually elimi- 
nated. Many of the Church supporters of the dictator believed 
the policies of the liberals in broadening religious freedom had 
contributed to a general decline in order. The new Penal Code of 
1928, which replaced that of 1870, returned to the concepts em- 
bodied in the Penal Code of 1848. It was again a crime to at- 
tempt to abolish the religion of the State or to mock the Catho- 
lic Church. Any public manifestation of a non-Catholic faith was 
punishable by three to six years in prison." 
56. Id. at 105. However, religious study was not mandatory for primary or secondary 
students whose parents were not Catholic. Id. 
57. Id. at 106. 
58. Id. at 108. 
59. Id. at 109-10. 
60. Id. at 107. 
61. R. HERR, supra note 38, at 115, 136-37. 
62. R. S ~ H ,  supra note 19, at 404. 
63. J. HUGHEY, supra note 17, at 110-12. 
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Several important concepts are evident from the. history of 
the Constitution of 1876. First, considerable latitude exists 
within a broad constitutional grant of religious toleration which, 
depending on the implementing legislation, allows for greater or 
lesser religious freedom. Secondly, it is possible to maintain rela- 
tively close church-state identification and still have some reli- 
gious freedom. Thirdly, as long as religious toleration is main- 
tained, no crossover to negative identification arises. The 
following section demonstrates that only when Primo de Rivera 
eliminated religious toleration did the positive identification be- 
come sufficiently high to prompt the transition to negative iden- 
tification under the Second Republic. 
D. The Constitution of 1931 and the Second Republic 
In 1931, after the fall of Primo de Rivera, the King allowed 
free municipal elections that resulted in a substantial victory for 
the Republicans." Hoping to avoid civil war, Alfonso XI11 went 
into voluntary exile, and a provisional Republican government 
came to power? This government acted immediately to reduce 
the powers of those segments of society that had supported the 
monarchy. The army was reorganized, and its power was re- 
stricted. Separation of church and state became a primary 
objec t i~e .~~ 
A new Cortes was elected to draft a new constitution. The 
vast majority of the deputies elected were either Socialist or Re- 
publican.67 As a result, the document they produced was much 
too liberal for much of the country that identified closely with 
Catholicism, but after years of repression the group now in con- 
trol was not interested in compromise. The positive identifica- 
tion of the Primo de Rivera years made possible a simple and 
rapid transition to negative identification. 
In the Cortes the debate on the Constitution proceeded 
smoothly until the first of the religious articles. The draft writ- 
ten by the provisional government called for separation of 
church and state, but gave the Catholic Church the position of a 
special corporation de derecho publico (of public right). This 
moderate approach was unacceptable to a majority of the depu- 
64. R. SMITH, supra note 19, at 413. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 431-32. 
67. R. HERR, supra note at 38, at 158. 
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ties who proposed total separation of church and state.68 Their 
viewpoint clearly dominated the religious articles as adopted: 
Article 3-The Spanish state has no official religion. 
Article 26-All religious denominations shall be considered as- 
sociations subject to special laws. 
The state, regions, provinces, and municipalities may not 
maintain, favour, or subsidize financially churches or religious 
associations and institutions. 
Those religious orders which impose by rule, in addition to 
the three canonical vows, the special vow of obedience to an 
authority other than the state, are dissolved. Their property 
shall be nationalized and employed for charitable and educa- 
tional purposes. 
The other religious orders shall be subject to a special law 
voted by this constituent Cortes on the following basis: 
1) Dissolution of those orders which, by their activities, 
constitute a menace to the safety of the state. . . . 
3) Inability to acquire and hold, either by themselves or 
through an agent, any more property than that assigned, after 
previous justification, for their support or for the direct attain- 
ment of their particular aims; 
4) Prohibition of their participation in industry, com- 
merce, or teaching. . . . 
6) . . . The property of the religious orders may be 
nationalized. 
Article 27-Liberty of conscience and the right to profess and 
practice any religion freely are guaranteed in Spanish territory, 
save for due respect to demands of public morality. 
Cemeteries shall be subject exclusively to civil jurisdiction. 
There may not be a separation of districts therein for religious 
reasons. 
All denominations may observe their rites privately. Public 
manifestations of the cults must be authorized, in any case, by 
the government. 
No one may be compelled to declare officially his religious 
beliefs.6s 
Since a majority of the Spanish people were still Catholic, 
these articles must be viewed as a form of negative identification 
or hostile separation of church and state rather than as estab- 
lishing religious freedom. This attitude is equally evident in the 
details of the separation of church and state, normally left to 
68. J. HUGHEY, supra note 17, at 120-25. 
69. A. VERDUIN, supra note 16, at 85, 88-89. 
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implementing legislation, which were spelled out in the Consti- 
tution of the Second Republic. Even ardent supporters of the 
Republic today recognize that the treatment of the religious 
question was ineffective and counterproductive, and probably 
the gravest error the Republicans made.70 
E. The Franco Period to 1963 
The actions of the Second Republic solidified Catholic op- 
position to the Republic and won Catholic support for Franco's 
forces when the Army finally revolted in 1936. The military re- 
volt was heralded as a crusade to save the Church from the com- 
munist infidels of the Republican g~vernment.~' The civil war 
lasted nearly three years, leaving the country "exhausted materi- 
ally and psych~logically."~~ A hundred thousand young men had 
been killed in the fighting and nearly half a million people were 
in exile.7s 
During the civil war there were numerous antireligious 
atrocities committed by both sides. Catholic worship was sus- 
pended during the war in all Repubican-held areas outside of 
the Basque countries; many churches were converted to other 
purposes or de~troyed.'~ Thousands of clergy were killed-many 
brutally murdered in cold-blooded executions for no other crime 
than having been a priest." Such actions were not limited to the 
Republican side. The Basque clergy, the most closely united 
with their people of any clergy in Spain, supported the Republic, 
and, as a result, large numbers of them were executed by Franco 
70. E. PEERS, supra note 14, at 155. The Republican government, and the imple- 
menting legislation it passed were so anticlerical that some people characterized the Re- 
publican government as a "Holy Anti-clerical Church." The deputies of the govemxhent 
not onIy adopted a divorce law, but enacted a law allowing for divorce by mutual consent 
after two years of marriage without any requirement of governmental approval. J. CROW, 
SPAIN: THE ROOT AND THE FLOWER 311 (1975). The cemeteries were not merely opened to 
all people, but a law was passed forbidding any form of religious burial unless it was 
specifically requested in a written will. Id. at 263. All Church properties were national- 
ized except those used for worship and all religious orders were forbidden to take part in 
any industrial, commercial, agricultural, or educational activities. E. PEERS, supra note 
14, at  147-49. 
71. J. CROW, supra note 70, at 320. See also P. BLANSHARD, FRJXEDOM AND CATHOLIC 
POWER IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL 21 (1962). 
72. R. HERR, supra no& 38, at 211. 
73. Id. 
74. J. HUGHEY, supra note 17, at 132-33. 
75. E. PEERS, supra note 14, at 167-76. 
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forces." Whether there was positive identification or negative 
identification, where no guarantees of religious freedom existed, 
the Church and its clergy suffered when their course did not 
parallel that of the government in power. 
With the victory of the Franco forces, positive identification 
became official Spanish policy, and the doctrine of Catholic 
unity was stronger than at  any time since the Inquisition. As at  
the time of the Inquisition, during the first twenty years under 
Franco all forms of repression were evident: censorship of the 
press," imprisonment for purely politico-religious crimes, and 
outright persecution of non-Catholic sects.18 
To insure the very high identification of the Catholic 
Church and the State and to help legitimize his government, 
Franco negotiated a new Concordat in 1953. The traditional 
power of patronage was extended to Franco, which allowed him 
to control the Church by submitting to the Pope the names from 
which any new bishops would be selected. Under the Concordat 
the Church was given such traditional privileges as the annual 
financial grant to clergy (this time with an escalation clause) and 
immunity for the clergy from arrest and imprisonment. Canon 
law was made an integral part of the governing law of Spain. 
Compulsory religious education was provided as a part of educa- 
tional instruction in all institutions of learning, whether state- 
owned or church-owned. The Catholic Church was to be the sole 
religion, and the only concession to religious toleration was that 
children of non-Catholic parents could be excused from the 
mandatory religion classes.79 
Beginning in 1947 a written constitutional framework was 
developed. The religion clauses found in title I, chapter I of the 
Fuero, the Spanish Bill of Rights originally read: 
The profession and practice of the Catholic religion, which 
is that of the Spanish State, will enjoy official protection. 
Nobody will be molested because of his religious beliefs or 
the private exercise of his cult. No external ceremonies or man- 
ifestations will be permitted except those of the Catholic 
76. J. HUGHEY, Supra note 17, at 133. See also CENTRO DE INFORMACI~N CAT~LICA 
INTERNACIONAL, EL CLERO Y LOS CATOLICOS VASCO-SEPARATISTAS Y EL MOVIMIENTO NA- 
CIONAL (1974). 
77. J. HUGHEY, supra note 17, at 140, 142. 
78. Id. at 142-43. 
79. P. BLANSHARD, supra note 71, at 267-74; J. CROW, supra note 70, at 353. 
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This amounted to an explicit statement of the most conservative 
interpretation of the religious toleration concept of the Constitu- 
tion of 1876, and in practice restricted non-Catholics more than 
any nineteenth-century approach. 
Periods of strong positive identification or strong negative 
identification in all of the cases so far considered have also been 
periods of little or no religious freedom. Such is the case in the 
Communist countries, in Franco Spain, in the Spain of 1848, and 
in the Islamic confessional states. As a country moves toward 
greater positive identification or negative identification, religious 
freedom decreases. This suggests a modification of the model. 
The straight line representing church-state identification ought 
to be bent into a loop and placed over the religious freedom line 
so that both the negative identification and the total identifica- 
tion ends of the line are above the no religious freedom end of 
that line. 
Some Identification 
of Church and State 









Bending the identification line and placing both positive 
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and negative identification over the no religious freedom portion 
of the freedom line illustrates two further principles that can be 
derived from the model: 
1) High positive identification of the church with the state 
and negative identification are very close, which allows for rela- 
tive ease of transition from one to the other. During several per- 
iods of Spanish history the government took actions-without 
any change in the written constitution-that represented a high 
degree of negative identification. Where no religious freedom ex- 
ists, there appears to be no protection against a rapid transition 
from high positive identification of church and state to anti- 
church or negative identification actions. 
2) The model suggests that movement along the identllica- 
tion line would require some corresponding movement on the re- 
ligious liberty line and vice versa. A country may, therefore, 
move away from the religious freedom section of the line by con- 
fusing anti-identification actions with those designed to provide 
religious freedom. This was precisely what happened in both 
Spanish Republics. Legislation designed to eliminate the identi- 
fication of the Catholic Church with the State resulted in the 
elimination of any vestiges of religious freedom. The opposite is 
also possible since increasing church-state identification is usu- 
ally associated with decreasing religious freedom. 
A more general principle that can be derived from the 
model is that there can be a variety of identification approaches 
associated with religious freedom, including either separation of 
church and state or some church-state identification. While 
Spain has had little experience in this area, the positioning of 
other European nations along the curved portion of the loop il- 
lustrates this diversity. 
Several additional conclusions, specifically relevant to con- 
temporary Spanish experience (although with some general ap- 
plication), need to be mentioned. First, the importance of imple- 
menting legislation is made clear by the circumstances 
surrounding the constitutions of 1837, 1876, and 1931. In each 
instance, apparently moderate positions in the written constitu- 
tions were pushed completely outside the area of religious lib- 
erty by the implementing legislation. Secondly, written laws 
dealing with religious matters can remain the same while the ac- 
tual governmental practice affecting religious freedom changes 
dramatically. Such was the case under the Constitution of 1876, 
and the same is true of the modern Communist states with their 
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constitutional guarantees of religious freedom. Thirdly, because 
of positive identification throughout Spain's entire constitu- 
tional period, the Catholic Church became more and more an 
integral part of the ruling oligarchy and closely tied, therefore, 
to conservative politics. This alignment prevented the Church 
from maintaining the viability and flexibility necessary to be an 
independent institution. Thus, the Church was unable to meet 
the challenges of changing political and social situations. 
IV. SPANISH CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 1963-1978 
Beginning as early as the mid-nineteenth century, foreign 
powers opposed the high church-state identification in Spain 
and the lack of religious freedom. This opposition came from 
two primary sources, the Vatican and non-Catholic liberal coun- 
tries such as Britain and the United States. While the influence 
of the former has been obvious during the entire constitutional 
period of Spanish history, the latter's influence became increas- 
ingly important during the Franco period following the 1953 
treaty between Spain and the United States. The growth of 
American military installations and international tourism in 
Spain also added foreign pressures.81 The reality of these pres- 
sures is evidenced by the fact that when Spanish laws of reli- 
gious toleration were introduced toward the end of the Franco 
period, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs played a leading 
role in their adoption.8s 
In earlier Spanish history, foreign pressure for increased re- 
ligious freedom had always been counteracted by pressure from 
the Vatican to maintain Catholic unity. That situation changed 
dramatically in the early 1960's because of Vatican 11. In 1965 
the international Catholic Church adopted an encyclical on reli- 
gious freedom:' wherein, for the first time, the Catholic Church 
officially encouraged religious freedom for all countries. The 
Spanish bishops at that conference were the strongest and most 
outspoken opponents of the new policy;84 nevertheless, it was 
clear that changes were necessary in Spain. 
Following Vatican I1 an amendment to the religious article 
of the Fuero, the Spanish Bill of Rights, was proposed as part of 
81. J. HUGHEY, supra note 17, v-vi, J. MONROY, supra note 15, at 60. 
82. J. HUGHEY, supra note 17, at v-vi. 
83. J. MONROY, supra note 15, at 52. 
84. N. COOPER, CATHOLICISM AND THE ~ C O  REGIME 29 (1975). 
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an entire reworking of the Spanish constitutional framework 
under the Organic Law of 1967. The first paragraph of that arti- 
cle, which established positive identification of church and state, 
was left intact, but the following declaration of religious freedom 
was added: "The State will assume the protection of religious 
liberty which will be guaranteed by effective juridical tutelage 
that at the same time safeguards public morality and order."86 
The legislation implementing this modification was more ef- ' 
fective than the ambiguous language of the constitutional guar- 
antee in causing real movement along the religious liberty line. 
And, perhaps of even more significance, Spain was about to ex- 
perience more than a decade of trauma in church-state relations 
which would gradually move it on the identification line to a 
point where religious liberty became a real possibility. 
At the beginning of this period forces were mounting that 
would make changes in the structure of church-state relations in 
Spain inevitable. One, already discussed briefly, was the amount 
of pressure from the Vatican and from democratic countries de- 
manding changes in return for greater integration of Spain into 
the community of nations. At this same time Spain was exper- 
iencing extensive social changes. The economic improvements 
that accompanied the rapid growth of the large cities and which 
triggered a large influx of tourists with foreign ideas wrought 
many changes in Spanish society.86 Both the Catholic Church 
and the Spanish government felt the impact of such changes, 
however, the Church reacted first. The year 1966 marked the es- 
tablishment of the Conferencia Episcopal Espafiola (CEE) in 
which all Spanish bishops participated in making national 
Church decisions, rather than only the twelve or thirteen arch- 
bishop~.~' The result was that many younger, more liberal bish- 
ops, and through them, younger priests and lay members, now 
had a means of effectively expressing their opinions, which more 
closely paralleled those of the international Catholic Church as 
expressed in Vatican 11. 
Conservative groups stood against these forces for change in 
church-state relations, and in spite of their clear minority statue, 
they held effective power in both Church and State matters. The 
Church was dominated by older Franco-appointed prelates 
85. h e r o  de los Espandles, tit. I, ch. I, art. 6, LEYEs FUNDAMENTALES D L REINO 
(1976). 
86. See R. HERR, supra note 38, at 19-25. 
87. F. GIL DELCAM), C O N F L I ~  GLESU-&TAM) 191-92 (1975). 
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whose ultraconservative position and outspoken intransigence at 
Vatican I1 focused the attention of the world on the archaic, if 
not absurd, conditions in the Spanish Church." The government 
was controlled by staunch Francoists who saw Catholic unity 
and national Catholicism as the principal bulwarks of the au- 
thoritarian, oligarchic state upon which their power and posi- 
tions were based?@ These groups waged an unsuccessful, though 
protracted, battle to keep Spain high on the positive end of the 
identification line and definitely on the no religious liberty por- 
tion of the other line. 
The forces pushing for modifications in church-state rela- 
tions in Spain reflected the extensive changes in Spanish society. 
By 1966 those forces were much more evident in the Church 
than in the State. As the Church tried to induce Spain to adopt 
less church-state identification the State resisted, resulting in a 
series of conflicts between the Catholic Church and the Spanish 
government. 
In 1968 the CEE established a commission to analyze the 
condition of the Church in Spain. In response to the commis- 
sion's survey the CEE called for elections of priests to an Asem- 
blea Conjunta de Sacerdotes y Obispos (Joint Assembly of 
Priests and Bishops) to be held in 1971.@O The resolutions 
adopted by the Joint Assembly clergy amounted to an expres- 
sion on the part of the Church which was tantamount to whole- 
sale transformation.@l 
The Church was now conscious of the needs of the people 
and of the political situation under which they lived. The Joint 
Assembly passed measures calling for an elimination of all civic 
and political discrimination based on faith or religion, and call- 
ing for the Church hierarchy to speak out when human rights 
were violated. Another resolution called for the right of the peo- 
ple within the Church to choose their own bishops. Other pro- 
posals called for a revision of the 1953 Concordat or preferably 
its replacement with a series of partial agreements. One espe- 
cially interesting proposal, which passed by a vote of 215 to 26, 
stated: "The juridical ordering which regulates relations between 
the Church and the State must safeguard the autonomy and in- 
dependence of both and, without diminishing the healthy coop- 
88. See N. COOPER, supra note $4, at 29. 
89. J. MONROY, supra note 15, at 51-52. 
90. F. GIL DELGADO, supra note 87, at 26. 
91. Id. at 27-28. 
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eration between them for the common good, eliminate every real 
or apparent situation of mutual concession of  privilege^."^' 
The Church desired to move on the identification line to a 
point of mutual independence, eliminating even the appearance 
of mutual concessions of privileges. This desire to lessen church- 
state identification reflects the significant changes that occurred 
in the 1960's in the Spanish Church hierarchy. The combined 
effects of natural attrition and Pope Paul VI's petition that all 
bishops retire at age seventy-five eliminated nearly a dozen of 
the most conservative prelates; on the other hand, only two of 
those viewed as liberal passed away during the same period. In 
replacing these men, the Pope appointed liberals who viewed the 
Church and its role in harmony with the perspective of Vatican 
II? 
The emergence of a new philosophical orientation was clear 
evidence of change in the Spanish Church during the early 
1970's. Gone was the National Catholicism of the civil war years 
and in its place appeared a universalist outlook that embraced 
the doctrines of Vatican I1 and world Catholicism. The Church 
was, and is, struggling to shed its image as one of the principal 
pillars of the ruling oligarchy, and thereby realign itself with the 
working and middle classes. Several of the bishops have called 
for greater social justice and have instituted extensive social re- 
form programs in their dioceses." Even the Jesuits, who in the 
past were bastions of traditionalism, have become reformers by 
organizing institutes for teaching theology to laymen.s6 
The Vatican has had at least a supportive role in all the 
changes that have taken place. Despite government opposition, 
liberal bishops have continually been appointed, and when gov- 
ernmental opposition has become too great, the Vatican has cir- 
cumvented provisions of the Concordat by leaving the bishoprics 
officially vacant and appointing auxiliary bishops for whom no 
government approval is neces~ary.~ In 1967 the Pope sent Luigi 
Dadaglio, a liberal with worldwide experience in difficult church- 
state situations, as nuncio to Madrid. He was specifically in- 
structed to push the conciliar movement forward in Spain? 
92. Id. at 28. 
93. S. PETSCHEN, LA IGLESIA EN LA ESPARA DE FRANCO 156-66 (1977). 
94. S. CLISSOLD, SPAIN 151 (1969). 
95. N. COOPER, supra note 84, at 38. 
96. ~ d :  at 39. 
97. S. PETSCHEN, supra note 93, at 156. 
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Dadaglio's involvement at some points became so great that he 
was personally attacked in the press and widely criticized, espe- 
cially by the conservative elements in Spanish society." How- 
ever, instead of cooperating with Spanish conservatives in state 
and church matters, Pope Paul continually rewarded liberal 
Spanish bishops with Cardinal's hats while passing over older, 
more conservative bishops.s9 
On the international level the Spanish Church and clergy 
are still very conservative; for example, the Spanish clergy 
wholeheartedly endorsed Pope Paul VI's ultraconservative en- 
cyclical on sex,loO but the position of the Spanish Church in 
Spanish society has been dramatically liberalized since 1967. 
A. State Conflict with the Church 1967-1975 
The changes in the Catholic Church brought it into direct 
and nearly continual conflict with the Spanish State until 
Franco's death. By the end of the 1960's the bishops of Spain 
encountered steadily increasing opposition from the government 
as they tried to bring the Church closer to the people. As early 
as 1966 the Church felt the wrath of public pressure over the 
government sponsored appointment of a non-Catalan to the 
Archbishopric of Barcelona.lol 
Perhaps the strongest evidence of the growing conflict was 
the 1971 statement from the Asemblea Conjunta (Joint Assem- 
bly) in which Spanish bishops and priests called for indepen- 
dence and autonomy for the Church from the State.lo2 The Joint 
Assembly barely missed the two-thirds majority required to pass 
a resolutionin obvious reference to the Church's civil war in- 
volvement-that stated: "We humbly recognize and ask forgive- 
ness for not having been true ministers of reconciliation, when it 
was necessary."lo3 The days when the Church was solidly united 
with the State, as it had been since the civil war, were clearly 
past by 1971, and the Church was seeking to move away from 
the strict conservatism Franco's government still espoused. 
The year 1973 proved to be the most bitter in church-state 
98. Id. at 157. 
99. N. COOPER, supra note 84, at 40. 
100. TRIUNFO, Feb. 21, 1976, at 33. 
101. S. PETSCHEN, supra note 93, at 157. 
102. F. GIL DELGADO, supra note 87, at 28. 
103. N. COOPER, supra note 84, at 40. 
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relations.lo4 The CEE issued "La Iglesia y la Comunidad Polit- 
ica " ("The Church and the Political Community"), which called 
for separation of the Church and the State and made specific 
recommendations as to certain rights and actions that bishops 
should demand for their people.lo6 During a heated debate in 
the Cortes over a proposed bill on conscientious objectors and 
military service, the CEE offered strong support for the more 
liberal antigovernment stands on the subject.106 In April, right- 
wing Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey (Guerillas of Christ the King) 
attacked and severely beat a group of fifteen Basque nationalist 
demonstrators, including five priests who were derisively re- 
ferred to as curas rojas (red priests).lo7 The Bishop of Bilbao 
excommunicated the Guerrilleros involved in the incident, 
whereas the government judge before whom the Guerrilleros ap- 
peared dismissed the case without a trial.loB Right-wing, govern- 
ment-condoned agitation became so pervasive that at the official 
funeral of Carrero Blanco, the Vice President of Spain who was 
assassinated in December 1973, the mass given by Archbishop 
Tarancon was interrupted by offensive shouts, such as "Taran- 
con to the firing squad" and "death to the red bishops."10s 
In February 1974, Anoveros, the Bishop of Bilbao, released 
a pastoral letter declaring that the Basques were hindered in 
their just liberty and their rightful cultural expression; he called 
for changes to allow them to be given such rights. The Franco 
government responded by placing Anoveros under house arrest 
and asking him to leave the country. Anoveros refused and 
threatened to excommunicate anyone who forced him. Only 
frantic negotiations involving Archbishop Tarancon and the pa- 
pal nuncio resolved the crisis.l1° 
Throughout this period the conflict was not limited to the 
level of bishops. Numerous fines were imposed on priests for 
speaking out in homilies or disturbing the public order in other 
ways.ll1 Rightists continued to attack liberal, reform-minded 
104. F. G a  DELGADO, supra note 87, at 235. 
105. Id. at 204, 216-34. 
106. Id. at 204-05. 
107. Id. at 235. See also N. COOPER, supra note 84, at 42; S. PETSCHEN, supra note 
93, at 143. 
108. F. G a  DELGADO, supra note 87, at 236. 
109. Id. at 238. See also N. COOPER, supra note 84, at 42. 
110. N. COOPER, supra note 84, at 43. 
111. TRIUNFO, Jan. 17,1976, at 49. Fines were used because they were not prohibited 
in the Concordat. 
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priests and laymen.l12 When the Catholic moderate paper, Ya, 
called for a "radical reassessment of the political situation" since 
reform was "long overdue," the editor was indicted, but the case 
was dismissed.llg The Church was moving away from the close 
church-state identification of the Franco period, and the govern- 
ment resisted that movement wherever possible. The Spanish 
Church was learning a lesson that should have been evident 
from its own history: When no real provisions have been made 
for safeguarding religious freedom, close ties between church 
and state can result in severe restrictions on a church, when ei- 
ther it or the government changes direction. 
B. Church-State Relations 1975-1 977 
An incident of church-state conflict in March, 1975, has 
been hailed as marking the beginning of the separation of 
church and state in Spain."' At that time the Archdiocese of 
Madrid had planned a "Christian Assembly" in the Madrid 
working class suburb of Vallecas as a dialogue between 
parishioners and priests on the social needs of the people and 
what the Church could do to meet those needs. A day before the 
assembly was to begin, the government refused to grant the nec- 
essary permit for such a large meeting. Archbishop Tarancon is- 
sued a pastoral letter condemning the government action and 
demanded an explanation, which never came.l16 
Immediately after Franco's death the situation seemed to 
continue as before. On December 7, 1975, a recently released 
priest and labor organizer was returned to prison on a charge of 
organizing an unauthorized demonstration. The priest had 
merely addressed a crowd that had gathered to welcome him 
back to Madrid.'ls One priest was arrested for involvement in 
demonstrations demanding amnesty, a focal point in the conflict 
between the Church and the State.l17 In February, 1976, the Ab- 
bot of the Montserrat Monastery called for amnesty at a mass 
attended by the King and Queen.l18 The Church's new attitude 
was summarized in statements by Tarancon in December, 1975, 
112. 35 FACTS ON FILE 861 (1975). 
113. Id. 
114. F. Gn. DELGADO, supra note 87, at 271. 
115. Id. at 271-76. 
116. 35 FACTS ON FILE 943 (1975). 
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at the annual meeting of the Conferencia Episcopal Espaliola 
(CEE). He advocated amnesty for all those who had been im- 
prisoned or forced into exile for purely political reasons, and 
stated: 
The theme that a Spain which is not Catholic is not Spain, no 
longer serves to express today the new relations between the 
Church and the rest of the world between religion and the Pa- 
tria, nor between faith and politics. That change must be ac- 
cepted because each day the difference between civil and eccle- 
siastical society becomes more and more accentuated.ll@ 
At first the position of the government toward these 
changes appeared uncertain. Interior Minister Manuel Fraga 
Iribarne issued a statement that many of the laws restricting as- 
sembly and religion would be only selectively enforced;120 how- 
ever, such statements were given little credence after incidents 
like the tear-gassing of a workers' meeting in a church in Vitto- 
ria, where police killed four workers.121 
In 1976, however, the posture of the government gradually 
changed. A series of amnesties freed most of the political prison- 
ers, and the exiles returned.lSS A political reform law created a 
new freely-elected Cortes, and all political parties, including the 
Communist party, were legalized.lSS The attitude of the new gov- 
ernment toward religious questions is best illustrated by the re- 
cent change in the Concordat of 1953. On July 28, 1976, Spain 
surrendered the right of Juan Carlos, as Chief of State, to ap- 
point Spanish bishops, and the Vatican surrendered the right of 
priests to an ecclesiastical forum, by which bishops had been 
able to block the civil trials of priests and nuns.lu Although it 
was only the first step in a delicate and difficult job of disentan- 
glement, this change reflected the more moderate direction 
church-state identification was taking in Spain. Spain was finally 
moving away from its former confessional-state status to a more 
moderate position. 
Where the Church and the State for four decades have been 
so thoroughly enmeshed, and where both historically and cultur- 
ally the union has been complete, except for brief and bitter mo- 
119. TRIUNFO, Jan. 24, 1976, at 49. 
120. 36 FACTS ON FILE 12 (1976). 
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ments, the process of separation is difficult and can be very emo- 
tional. In 1976 three major legal tasks confronted Spain: first, 
the issues of church-state identification and religious freedom 
had to be constitutionally delineated; secondly, within those 
constitutional limits the implementing legislation had to be 
carefully drafted to treat a myriad of key issues, including mar- 
riage, death, education and taxes; and finally, the Concordat 
with the Vatican had to be replaced with an arrangement that 
recognized the new realities and eliminated the conflicts that al- 
ready existed in the legal structure established by the Concordat 
in areas such as Spanish family law. 
The question of church-state relations was at the forefront 
of the debate surrounding the new Constitution. In November, 
1977, the rough draft of the new Constitution was leaked from 
the closed-door committee to the press. Its appearance coincided 
with the annual meeting of the CEE. The Catholic leaders in 
this meeting issued a statement analyzing the problems of de- 
claring Spain a nonconfessional state.12s The CEE was con- 
cerned not only with article 3 of the rough draft, which guaran- 
teed religious liberty and also stated that the Spanish State is 
not confessional, but also with article 31, which guaranteed free 
education for everyone, yet made no provision for handling the 
large number of government-financed Catholic schools.126 The 
CEE spoke out on both of these issues. In what was an apparent 
contradiction to the position taken by the Church in recent 
years favoring separation of the Church and the State, the bish- 
ops called for the elimination of any statement that the State is 
nonconfessional; they also advocated an explicit recognition of 
the historical and social reality of the role the Catholic Church 
plays in Spanish society.12' The CEE's statements against total 
secularization of education and removal of public financing of 
parochial schools have been followed by an impressive campaign 
for freedom of education, which means continued support of 
Church schools for those parents who wish to send their children 
to Catholic schools. Two weeks after the CEE statements the 
campaign surfaced with a massive public rally in Madrid calling 
attention to the dangers inherent in having only lay sch001s.l~~ 
These developments were reminiscent of the early days of 
125. BLANCO Y NEGRO, NOV. 30, 1977, at 22. 
126. YA, Nov. 23, 1977, at 9-10. 
127. BLANCO Y NEGRO, NOV. 30, 1977, at 22. 
128. C-10, Dec. 19, 1977, at 10-11. 
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the Second Republic, causing emotions and fears to run high in 
Madrid. Fortunately under the surface were calmer waters so 
that the new Constitution and the accompanying implementing 
legislation avoided the extremes of both the Second Republic 
and the Franco years. 
From this climate of moderation and compromise came the 
Spanish Constitution of 1978 that separated the Catholic 
Church from the State by declaring in section 3 of article six- 
teen: "No religion shall have a state character. The public pow- 
ers shall take into account the religious beliefs of Spanish soci- 
ety and maintain the appropriate relations of cooperation with 
the Catholic Church and other  denomination^."^^^ This moves 
Spain along the line of church-state identification to the clear 
separation called for by the Church during the last years of the 
Franco era and sought by nearly everyone since Franco's death. 
For the first time in a long and bitter constitutional history, it 
appears that Spain may find a point on the identification line 
that suits her cultural and national composition. 
Unlike all past Spanish constitutions, this one was the re- 
sult of the efforts of nearly all sectors of Spanish society. It 
passed by an almost unanimous vote in both houses of the Span- 
ish Cortes on October 31, 1978. As one Spanish newspaper 
observed: 
The Constitution of 1978 is different than all others. It has 
been composed by the enemies of yesterday, working elbow to 
elbow, converted for this high occasion to cooperating adversa- 
ries. It arises not from a forced imposition, but from a pact. It 
is not the Constitution of half of Spain against the other half, 
but of nearly all Spaniards for all Spaniards. Neither the 
Church as such nor the Armed Forces as such have partici- 
pated in the debates nor in the votes; the renowned military 
men designated senators by the King have not contended to 
represent the Armed Forces, nor have the respectable priests, 
[elected deputies and senators from the center and socialist 
parties] represented the Church. The vote of neither the for- 
mer nor the latter was unanimous. Church and Army have ful- 
filled, in the constituent process, their secular function as in- 
ternal supportive institutions, rather than their long-attributed 
role as supplementary political  institution^.'^^ 
129. 13 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, SPAIN 4 (A. Blaustein & G. 
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Separation of church and state is now established not only 
constitutionally in Spain, but also in the attitudes and philoso- 
phies of both secular and ecclesiastical leaders. While the new 
Constitution does not "forcefully impose the name of God"lS1 on 
the Spanish people, it does recognize the special character of 
churches, particularly the Catholic Church. For example, all 
churches have been extended special status as public 
corporations. 
Implementing legislation will of necessity further delineate 
the exact nature of the roles state and church will play in Spain 
under the new Constitution. However, unlike many nations of 
the world, the separation of church and state in Spain will not 
remove the Catholic Church from the active involvement dic- 
tated by its dominant position in Spanish culture and society. 
The exact point Spain will assume on the separation portion of 
the identification line will be determined by the political process 
of the new Spanish democracy. 
C. Religous Liberty in Spain 1967-1977 
The Organic Law of 1967 introduced the concept, or at least 
the language, of religious liberty into the Spanish Constitution. 
As with other constitutional declarations, such as the one found 
in the Constitution of 1876, the actual degree of religious liberty 
permitted depends on the implementing legislation that inter- 
prets the constitutional terms. That legislation principally took 
the form of the Religious Liberty Act of 1967.lS2 Enactment of 
this Act was delayed for much of 1967 by opposition within the 
Cortes where conservative groups, in both the Church and the 
State, still held almost total power.laS Those within the Church 
feared a sudden onslaught of proselyting among a Catholic pop- 
ulation totally unprepared to handle it, and those within the 
State feared a loss of the kind of total control that the govern- 
ment had been able to maintain, even over Catholics.ls4 These 
forces shaped the form the law took. The new law met the con- 
stitutional mandate of religious freedom, fulfilled Vatican 11's 
declaration on religious liberty, and preserved the State's con- 
trol. However, the ultimate confessionality of Spain was guaran- 
131. Id. 
132. Ley 44i1967, 156 Boletin Oficial del Estado 9191-94 (July 4, 1967). 
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teed in such a way as to place Spain not in the religious liberty 
portion, but the religious toleration portion, of that line. 
The Religious Liberty Act of 1967 guaranteed the right to 
profess both privately and publicly one's religion within certain 
limitations. Religious liberty was subordinated to the Catholic 
confessionality of the Spanish State. All persons had to manifest 
respect for the official religion of the State and for public or- 
der.lS6 The Religious Liberty Act of 1967, much like the Consti- 
tution of 1876, guaranteed the individual's right to religious lib- 
erty provided the exercise of that right did not encroach upon 
the Catholic Church or in some way endanger the State. 
Confessional associations (the term applied to non-Catholic 
churches) were recognized and given the right to hold meetings, 
but only in temples and other authorized places.lS6 Before the 
status of a confessional asshiation could be attained, each 
church had to register with the government and be approved.lS7 
The possessions of such associations, limited to those things ac- 
tually used by its membership, had to be registered and used 
only for statutorily allowed purposes.1s8 All confessional associa- 
tions were required to submit a yearly report on the receipt and 
disposition of  donation^.'^@ The Ministry of Justice reserved the 
right to suspend the activities of any association believed to be 
expending money for impermissible purposes.140 Finally, all acts 
by the associations or individual members which could be 
viewed as proselyting were prohibited."' 
Four major principles characterized the Religious Liberty 
Act of 1967: 
1) The Spanish State tried to make compatible the continu- 
ance of traditional control of non-Catholics (just as it controlled 
Catholics) with the new Catholic doctrines of religious 
freedom.142 
2) The Act continued to respect the position of Spain as a 
Catholic, confessional state.14s 
3) The Act reflected the Spanish legislature's preoccupation 
135. Ley 4411967, art. 2.1, 156 Boletin Oficial del Estado 9191-94 (July 4, 1967). 
136. Id. art. 21. 
137. Id. art. 14. 
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with expressly incorporating each aspect of Vatican I1 into its 
laws of religious liberty."' 
4) Because the right to register could be denied only if 
mechanical procedures were not followed, in effect, all non-Cath- 
olic groups could achieve legal status. In that registration pro- 
cess there was a danger that the law could become a kind of 
apartheid for non-Catholics because even though it insured 
equality of rights on the individual level, it prohibited most 
forms of aggressive proselyting, required registration of all min- 
isters, and allowed close governmental control of all finances.14' 
Criticism and opposition to the Act came from many 
quarters. Many of the non-Catholic groups in Spain refused to 
register either because they feared that such registration would 
only make harassment or persecution easier, or because they be- 
lieved that the law did not in reality represent true religious 
freedom and therefore should not be complied with.146 As re- 
cently as 1970, three major Protestant groups still refused to 
register.147 
The Religious Liberty Act of 1967 has also been criticized 
for failing to meet the spirit of Vatican IL14B By protecting the 
confessional status of the State and leaving control over other 
religions in the hands of the government, the Act failed to meet 
the Vatican I1 concept that there can be no special recognition 
for one religion unless religious liberty for others is concomi- 
tantly g~aranteed."~ The Act not only left more legal control 
with the state than Vatican I1 prescribed, it also failed to com- 
ply with Vatican I1 in social matters, especially in its limitation 
of non-Catholic public religious  manifestation^.^^^ In reality, the 
Religious Liberty Act of 1967 was merely a statute of religious 
toleration conceded to the non-Catholic minority, and was not 
the kind of constitutional safeguard of religious liberty envi- 
sioned by Vatican II.161 
Because of the Spanish State's extensive control of the ap- 
plication of the law, and the limitations placed on the confes- 
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6161 CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 649 
sional associations, the efficacy of the law depended greatly on 
whether the civil rights of non-Catholics were respected in local 
incidents. Generally, non-Catholic groups found that during the 
early years of the law they were able to hold regular religious 
services without harrassment, but activity beyond that depended 
on the attitude of the local officials and police. Although little 
has been written about those years and the operation of the law 
of religious liberty, discussions with leaders of non-Catholic 
groups indicate a varying pattern of toleration and harassment. 
Missionaries were sometimes jailed for street proselyting and in 
some cases ordered out of towns. Plainclothes police kept close 
surveillance of non-Catholic individuals and were known to 
break up meetings held in private homes when attended by 
more than six persons.lS2 
Observations of the author and discussions with some reli- 
gious leaders indicate that during the Juan Carlos years nearly 
all of the harassment has disappeared. The police no longer ap- 
pear to be continually watching and interfering with the activi- 
ties of non-Catholics. This expanded freedom has also been ac- 
companied by an increase in the amount of media publicity 
given non-Catholic groups. The number of non-Catholic reli- 
gious adherents, and the number of their physical facilities have 
significantly increased. 
The high positive identification between the Catholic 
Church and the Spanish State has decreased, and religious free- 
dom has correspondingly increased. Evidence of this is found in 
article sixteen of the new Constitution: 
1) Freedom of ideology, religion, and cult of individuals and 
communities is guaranteed without any limitation in their 
demonstrations other than that which is necessary for the 
maintenance of public order protected by law. 
2) No one may be obliged to make a declaration on his ideol- 
ogy, religion, or beliefs.lSs 
While further changes are expected because of modifications 
in the church-state identification provisions of the new Constitu- 
tion, Spain has clearly moved into the full religious liberty sec- 
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tion of that line. 
A. Changes in Spain 1967-1 979 
In 1967, the Spanish State passed the Organic Law that at- 
tempted to move Spain into the religious freedom portion of 
that line without making a change in church-state identification. 
However, as the model indicates, religious liberty was impossible 
without some corresponding movement in church-state identifi- 
cation. Consequently, the Religious Liberty Act of 1967 achieved 
only religious toleration because conservative elements in the 
Church and the State blocked any changes in church-state 
identification. 
Although there were no further changes in the religious laws 
of the State until after Franco's death, there were dramatic 
changes within the Church throughout the late 1960's and early 
1970's. Through a process of natural attrition by death and re- 
tirement combined with continuing papal influence in the ap- 
pointment of new bishops, a group of younger bishops led by 
Cardinal Tarancon assumed the leadership of the Spanish Cath- 
olic Church. These new bishops, as well as a majority of the 
lower clergy, followed the philosophical lines of post-conciliar, 
international Catholicism. They saw the role of the Church as 
being social as well as spiritual. The Church was to help the 
masses, promote social justice, and defend and protect the op- 
pressed. Gone were the days of National Catholicism when the 
Church was viewed as a mainstay of the oligarchy. 
These new positions brought the Church into conflict with 
the State. For the first time in thirty or forty years the two insti- 
tutions were not pursuing parallel, mutually beneficial courses. 
Relations between the State and the liberal Church hierarchy 
deteriorated to such an extent that a bishop was even arrested 
and threatened with exile. The Catholic Church painfully 
learned that where high positive identification exists there is in 
reality no religious freedom, even for the dominant church. 
The death of Franco and the end of his dictatorship finally 
brought changes within the government. Juan Carlos and his 
ministers began to dismantle the dictatorship and erect a de- 
mocracy within the same governmental superstructure. In the 
area of church-state relations, the only initial documental or 
structural change was an agreement with the Vatican wherein 
6161 CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS 651 
Juan Carlos surrendered the right of patronage and the Church 
in return gave up the right of ecclesiastical forum. Increased 
freedom of press, permitting open discussion of nearly every- 
thing, including religious matters, was visible evidence of further 
change. Although no formal separation of the Church and the 
State had been declared, there was, in the early stages, tacit 
agreement that such an approach was necessary. Groundwork 
for acceptance of the new Constitution was being laid. 
With these changes in the Catholic Church and the State, 
Spain had unofficially shifted its position on the identification 
line. There was, therefore, a corresponding movement on the re- 
ligious liberty line to an area of de facto religious liberty. The 
new Constitution made religious liberty de jure. Implementing 
legislation must soon follow to establish safeguards in the legal 
system to protect it. While the details of future Spanish church- 
state relations cannot be predicted, the following broad observa- 
tions are evident from the developments of the past decade, es- 
pecially in light of earlier church-state relations in Spain. Given 
the power of the Catholic Church and center- and right-wing 
forces in Spain and the apparent acceptance by the left-wing of 
the need to recognize the social reality of the Church, a higher 
degree of church-state identification in comparison to the degree 
of church-state separation in other nations will likely occur. 
Eventually, a system will probably emerge involving ceremonial 
and governmental connections like those between the Church of 
England and the government of Great Britain, coupled with 
financial and legal recognition arrangements similar to those in 
the Federal Republic of Germany. Government funding for 
Church programs in areas such as education, restoration of his- 
torical buildings, and social welfare will also likely continue. 
Apart from the official relations between institutions, 
Church political involvement will almost certainly continue. In a 
country where a large percentage of the population is Catholic, 
the Church can be expected and ought to have every right to 
speak out in persuasive, but not commanding, tones on subjects 
affecting not only the Church as an institution, but her individ- 
ual members. Real success in the separation of the Church and 
State and in the implementation of religious liberty will come 
when the Catholic Church can play the important role that its 
history and numerical superiority in Spain require and still al- 
low the development of a more pluralistic society. 
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B. Implications Inherent in the Model 
One of the purposes of this comparative analysis of church- 
state relations in Spain during her constitutional period is to de- 
velop a model that can be applied to church-state relations 
generally. 
Some Identification 
of Church and State 
\ Positive Identification 







Although the model has proved valid in analyzing both his- 
torical and contemporary Spanish church-state problems, other 
useful observations may also be made. On several occasions in 
Spanish history, a change in government has taken place that, 
with no accompanying constitutional or institutional changes, 
has brought the Spanish State from a position of positive identi- 
fication to one of negative or anti-Church identification. At least 
one historical example of the reverse process occurred when 
France moved from the anticlerical persecutions of the Revolu- 
tion to the Concordat with the Vatican under Napoleon in rela- 
tively few years.lM This ease of movement is explained by the 
close proximity in the model of both positive and negative iden- 
tification to no religious freedom. As the Spanish Church has 
discovered several times in its history, and most recently during 
the last years of the Franco period, the church that maintains 
close identification with a state is free only as long as its desires 
parallel those of the state. When the church tries to take a dif- 
ferent course than that of the state, conflicts and tensions, like 
154. C. CORRAL SALVADOR, supra note 3, at 53-60. 
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those observed in the late 1960's and early 1970's in Spain, are 
likely to occur. The result is that the church will suffer because 
of the bonds that tie it to the state. 
Another general principle, evident from the model, is that 
religious freedom can cease to exist whenever identification be- 
comes either highly positive or highly negative. This conclusion 
is supported not only by Spanish history but by current condi- 
tions in many nations. 
Another conclusion evident from Spanish history is that re- 
ligious liberty can be destroyed by excessive actions to eliminate 
identification of church and state. Such was the case during the 
Second Spanish Republic. However, the Spanish experience in 
the last fifteen years has shown that it is possible to have a grad- 
ual movement from high positive identification to separation of 
church and state, provided the movement is accompanied by an 
ever-increasing amount of religious freedom, and the written 
laws governing religious liberty are sufficiently broad. 
The model also demonstrates the wide area the identifica- 
tion loop provides in the religious freedom section of that line. 
The wide variety of identification combinations implied by the 
loop is evidenced by the varying patterns of friendly separation 
and mild identification found among the countries of the world 
recognizing and practicing religious freedom. Since each nation 
is different, each must find its own answers to the questions of 
church-state relations while maintaining the universal goal of re- 
ligious freedom. The future will show if Spain and other nations 
can discover the degree of separation of church and state that 
meets the realities of their own unique social and historical cir- 
cumstances, but that also establishes true religious freedom. 
George R. Ryskamp 
